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Summary
Since time immemorial, African indigenous societies have viewed child-
hood in terms of intergenerational obligations of support and reciprocity, 
and deemed the period of childhood as that for acquiring the social and 
technical skills necessary to perform the future roles of adulthood. Children 
represent lineage continuity and, most importantly, the material survival 
of their families and the communities at large. International human rights 
instruments embody a contemporary approach to childhood which views 
it as a distinct and separate stage of innocence, physical weakness, men-
tal immaturity and general vulnerability — a period ideologically excluded 
from the production of value. With these differences in the approaches 
to child development, the potential for discordance between African 
customary laws and practices on the one hand and the objectives of the 
international children’s rights instruments, on the other hand, is real. 
Can a world of such social and cultural diversity possibly attain universal 
interpretation, application and acceptance of the international norms of 
children’s rights? The article highlights the challenges involved in apply-
ing the international prohibition on child labour to traditional societies of 
Southern Africa and offers a few compromises for a relevant regime for 
the region.
* BA Law LLB (Lesotho), LLM PhD (Cape Town); tendai.chakarisa@uct.ac.za. This article 
is an extract from the author’s PhD thesis entitled ‘International prohibition on child 
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Introduction
‘The term “child labour” is an emotive one.’1 For some people it 
conjures up images of dirty, malnourished children shackled in chains, 
while for others, particularly those of the developing world, the term 
simply means the work done by children with no negative connotation 
attached to it. It is, however, the media images of suffering children 
that have prompted a global explosion of interest in the activities of 
children and fuelled the crusade against child labour.
Human rights activists and health and educational professionals 
describe child labour as abusive. They say it involves working for long 
hours under ‘dangerous’ and ‘unhealthy’ conditions, with a lack of 
physical and social security, and minimal remuneration. Labouring 
children are deprived of the freedom to play or rest, not to mention the 
time to devote to their education.2 All these factors cause ‘irreversible 
physical and psychological damage’ to a child or even death.
Between 1919 and the early 1970s, the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) enacted numerous conventions regulating the minimum 
age of employment of children in various sectors.3 In 1973, the inter-
national crusade against child labour reached an important milestone 
with the adoption of the Convention Concerning Minimum Age for 
Admission to Employment (Minimum Age Convention).4 By apply-
ing its provisions to all areas of economic activity, the Convention 
expanded prior sectoral coverage to include ‘all employment or work’. 
With this Convention, the ILO committed itself, for the first time, to 
achieving the total abolition of child labour, and thus urged member 
states to institute national policies in order, ultimately, to bring an end 
to children’s involvement in employment. The ILO obliged states to 
1 J McKechnie & S Hobbs ‘Child labour: A global phenomenon?’ (1999) 8 Child Abuse 
Review 87.
2 Human Rights watch ‘Child labor’ http://hrw.org/children/labor.htm (accessed 
14 June 2007). 
3 Eg, the Convention Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Indus-
trial Employment (C 005) of 1919; the Convention Concerning the Night Work of 
Young Persons Employed in Industry (C 006) of 1919; the Convention Fixing the 
Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Employment at Sea (C 007) of 1920; 
the Convention Concerning the Age for Admission of Children to Employment in 
Agriculture (C 010) of 1921; the Convention Fixing the Minimum Age for the Admis-
sion of Young Persons to Employment as Trimmers or Stokers (C 015) of 1921; the 
Convention concerning the Age for Admission of Children to Non-Industrial Employ-
ment (C 033) of 1932; the Convention Concerning the Restriction of Night Work of 
Children and Young Persons in Non-Industrial Occupations (C 079) of 1946; the 
Convention Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment as Fisher-
men (C 112) of 1959; the Convention Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission 
to Employment Underground in Mines (C 123) of 1965. 
4 C 138 adopted on 26 June 1973 and entered into force on 19 June 1976. K Hanson & 
A Vandaele ‘Working children and international labour law’ (2003) 11 International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 99.
       
progressively raise the minimum age for admission to work, ‘consistent 
with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons’.5
The minimum age standards expressed an ideal of childhood as a 
‘privileged phase of life, properly dedicated only to play and schooling, 
and with an extended period of dependence during which economic 
activity is discouraged or actually denied’.6 It would seem that the 
Minimum Age Convention was motivated by an assumption that, if 
the minimum age were raised, the physical and mental development 
of children would be enhanced since they would not be allowed to 
work until mid-adolescence. It set the minimum age at 15.7 Coun-
tries with relatively undeveloped economies and educational facilities 
were allowed temporarily to adopt a lower standard of 14, as long as 
employers’ and workers’ organisations were in agreement.8
The Convention also applied different minimum ages to light and 
hazardous work. It set the minimum age for light work at 13,9 but 
that could be lowered to 12 in developing countries on condition that 
it did not impede schooling.10 For dangerous work, the Convention 
set a limit of 18, and allowed children aged 16 to undertake such work 
only if their safety and morals were fully protected and they received 
sufficient specific instruction or professional training.11
Standards set in this Convention, like those preceding it, were linked 
to schooling. The treaty expressed this tradition by stipulating that ‘the 
minimum age shall not be less than the age of completion of compul-
sory schooling’.12 Where the maximum age of compulsory schooling 
was above 15 years, the minimum age of employment was accordingly 
raised.13
From the early 1980s, international concerns about children’s rights 
produced more instruments on children’s issues which brought a new 
understanding of the phenomenon of child labour. In November 1989, 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), an instrument providing a wide range of 
entitlements for children.14 By September 1990, the Convention had 
5 Art 1; J Boyden et al What works for working children (1998) 188.
6 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 195.
7 Art 2(3). The Convention was supplemented by Recommendation 146 which advo-
cated the raising of the minimum age to 16 years. In general, the recommendation 
provides the broad framework and essential policy measures for both the prevention 
of child labour and its elimination. It, however, recommends that the ‘minimum age’ 
should be fixed at the same level for all sectors of economic activity. 
8 Art 2(4). Boyden et al (n 5 above) 195 188.
9 Art 7(1).
10 Art 7(4).
11 Arts 3(1) & (3).
12 Art 3. Hanson & Vandaele (n 4 above) 99.
13 Art 2(3).
14 GA Res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) 167, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), 
entered into force 2 September 1990.
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entered into force and, by the turn of the century, a record 191 states 
had ratified it.15 With regard to child labour, the Convention specifically 
provided as follows:16
State parties [are to] recognise the right of the child to be protected from 
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be 
hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the 
child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
With this provision, CRC laid the foundation for a renewed understand-
ing of the concept of child labour (although it did not define the term). 
Child labour could now be determined not according to the activity (as 
previous ILO Conventions provided), but according to the effect of the 
activity on the children concerned. Using the effects of the activity on 
the child as a point of departure altered numerous aspects of dealing 
with child labour. Firstly, any labour activity, regardless of whether it 
takes place at a work place or in the child’s home, could be deemed 
unacceptable if it was detrimental to the development of the child. 
This meant that the millions of children (mainly girls) taken out of 
school to do housework were now classified as children engaging in 
child labour. Although CRC was not the first UN Convention to provide 
for child labour, it enlarged the scope of the prohibition of economic 
exploitation.17
In June 1999, the ILO adopted the Convention Concerning the Prohi-
bition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour (Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention).18 By Novem-
ber 2000, the Convention had entered into force. To date, 171 of the 
183 member states of the ILO have ratified it.19
The Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention reflects a global con-
sensus that there should be an immediate end to offensive forms of 
child labour. It seeks to complement existing international instruments 
such as the Minimum Age Convention (which is aimed at the overall 
abolition of child labour).20 
The Convention came up with two categories of unacceptable 
labour: the worst forms and work hazardous to the physical, emotional 
and moral wellbeing of the child. The worst forms include slavery, debt 
bondage, prostitution, pornography, forced recruitment of children for 
use in armed conflict, use of children in drug trafficking and other illicit 
15 United Nations treaty collection http://www.treaties.un.org (accessed 26 March 
2010).
16 Art 32(1).
17 Art 10(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
prohibited the exploitation of children. 
18 ILO Convention 182.
19 List of ratifications for ILO Convention 182 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.
pl?C182 (accessed 26 March 2010).
20 It also stipulates the minimum age for admission to employment which must not be 
less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling.
       
activities, and all other work harmful or hazardous to the health, safety 
or morals of children.21 Article 4(1) leaves it to state members to define 
hazardous forms of child labour in their national legislation. Such types 
of work are usually conducted in legitimate sectors of economic activ-
ity and are thus called ‘worst forms by condition’. These forms may be 
improved if, for example, they are currently affecting the health and 
safety of the children who engage in them. A good example are adoles-
cents above the minimum working age engaged in conditions of work 
which are inherently hazardous or too arduous for them. If a young 
person works in a factory using machinery without safety guards, then 
fitting a protection device to the machine may make it non-hazardous, 
and then this activity would cease to fall under the category of worst 
forms as defined by the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention.
Meanwhile, Africa became the first continent to adopt a children’s 
rights treaty specially adapted to the conditions of the region. In July 
1990, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisa-
tion of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter). It would take 
another nine years before the instrument entered into force.22
Scholars contend that the instrument was born out of the feeling 
by African member-states that CRC missed important socio-cultural 
and economic realities of the African experience. The African Children’s 
Charter thus prides itself on its ‘African’ perspective of human rights, 
and takes into consideration the virtues of the African cultural heritage, 
and the values of African civilisation which are expected to inspire 
and characterise the African concept of the rights and welfare of the 
child.23
Nevertheless, it was inspired by the trends evident in the UN system. 
In line with CRC, the African Children’s Charter provides that24
[e]very child shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation and 
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with 
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
21 Arts 3(a)-(c). This article will not dwell on the worst forms of child labour.
22 To date, 45 countries out of the 53 members of the AU have ratified the Charter. 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm (accessed 
26 March 2010); A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child and the African Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 179, DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits 
of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 157.
23 Lloyd (n 22 above) 180-183.
24 Art 15(2)(d) also encourages the dissemination of information on the dangers of 
child labour to all sectors of the community, having regard to the relevant ILO instru-
ments relating to children.
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It also provides for protection against sexual exploitation,25 and the 
prevention of the sale, trafficking and abduction of children.26 The 
African Children’s Charter recognises the right of children to play and 
leisure27 and, like CRC, it provides that, in all matters concerning the 
welfare of the child, the ‘best interests of the child’ are to be given 
paramount consideration.28
Notwithstanding this section on best interests, the African Children’s 
Charter takes it cue from its predecessor, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),29 to impose certain ‘responsi-
bilities’ on children towards their family, society, the state and other 
legally-recognised communities and the international community. 
Article 31 provides that
[t]he child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations as may be 
contained in the present Charter, shall have the duty:
(a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors 
and elders at all times and to assist them in case of need;
(b) to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellec-
tual abilities at its service;
(c) to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity;
(d) to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with 
other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and 
consultation and to contribute to the moral well-being of society;
(e) to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his 
country;
(f) to contribute to the best of his abilities at all times and at all levels, to 
the promotion and achievement of African unity.
Children’s rights activists declare that this provision of duties reinforces 
a conservative approach to human rights. They say that it represents 
the most elaborate limitation on children’s rights, particularly those 
concerned with labour, and they fear that the emphasis on the duty 
of the individual, rather than that of the state, undermines the force 
of children’s rights. Activists, therefore, argue that the preservation of 
African cultural norms may actually encourage child labour.30 As such, 
the Charter’s provision of duties is often viewed as ‘little more than the 
formulation, entrenchment and legitimation of adult and state rights 
and privileges against children’.31
25 Art 27 African Children’s Charter.
26 Art 29 African Children’s Charter. 
27 Art 12 African Children’s Charter.
28 Art 4(1) African Children’s Charter. 
29 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev 5, reprinted in C Heyns & M Killander (eds) Compen-
dium of key human rights documents of the African Union (2006) 23, adopted on 
27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986.
30 M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
system in practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 229.
31 M Mutua ‘The African human rights system: A critical evaluation’ http://hdr.undp.
org/docs/publications/background_papers/MUTUA.PDF (accessed 4 March 2004).
       
The excitement over this provision in the African Charter is, however, 
astounding, considering that article 29(1) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) provides that ‘[e]veryone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full development 
of his personality is possible’. The Preambles of both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also make 
reference to the individual’s ‘duties to other individuals and to the com-
munity to which he belongs’.32 One would contend that the African 
Children’s Charter only goes further in providing a ‘more specific and 
detailed range of duties of the individual’. Moreover, those objecting to 
the provision on the duties of the child in the African Children’s Charter 
seem not to have noticed that inherent in article 31 are two limita-
tions: that the duties of the children are subject to their age and ability 
(thus paying credence to the evolving capacities of the child); and that 
these responsibilities of children are subject to ‘such limitations as may 
be contained in the present Charter’ (in this case those which guard 
against the various forms of abuse of the child).33
It is, however, the international community’s apparently overwhelm-
ing support for CRC and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
that implies a high degree of international agreement on children’s 
rights. This backing is based on an assumption that the institutionalisa-
tion of children’s rights and the abolition of child labour at a global 
level will result in the improvement of the lives of all children. While 
states have displayed an obvious consensus of concern for children, 
there is nevertheless disagreement on the conception of childhood, the 
period of growth that should be protected, and the laws and policies 
needed to bring about an improvement in child welfare, particularly 
those designed to tackle child labour.
The following discussion seeks to explore the extent and complexities 
of the challenges involved in identifying an effective and comprehensive 
set of legal measures for dealing with child labour in African cultural set-
tings. It must be borne in mind from the outset that this article focuses 
on the general forms of child labour which most children are engaged 
in, rather than the worst forms (covered by the ILO Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention on the Rights of the Child), the dangers of 
which are universally acknowledged and condemned.
Without intending to polarise the debate, the article generalises the 
ideologies underlying international instruments and those of African 
societies (found in rural areas, where the majority of the continent’s 
population resides) and concedes from the onset that in as much as 
32 These provisions, however, seem to be at odds with the human rights regime’s 
general emphasis on individuality. J Sloth-Nielsen & BD Mezmur ‘A dutiful child: 
The implications of article 31 of the African Children’s Charter’ (2008) 52 Journal of 
African Law 159 160. 
33 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (n 32 above) 170. 
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there are differences, there are also shared commonalities between 
them. As a matter of fact, both share the concern for the child, impose 
restraints on the abuse of children and assure human dignity in all 
material respects. Today, they place great value on the health, educa-
tion and general welfare of the child even if in different ways. There are 
also some sections of Western society where children work.34
While this article essentially calls for the formulation, interpretation 
and implementation of all internationally-recognised human rights in 
their proper cultural context, it takes note of the limits of culture, and 
warns of the dangers of essentialising culture and acknowledges the 
changes that have been brought to African societies by urbanisation, 
globalisation and multi-culturalism.
2 Cultural influences
Culture is a major influence on a child’s upbringing. It determines the 
context in which children work, the prevailing opinions about the value 
of that work and the attitudes to the raising of children.35 In societies 
of the developed world, family life is based on a nuclear unit, often 
in isolation from other kin.36 They value an underlying ‘individualistic’ 
culture in the developmental goals of childhood which promote the 
individual’s acquisition of competence and independence.37
CRC and the ILO Conventions embody such contemporary ideals. 
These instruments emphasise individuality and professional interven-
tions, and they de-emphasise the influence of wider social, economic 
and cultural circumstances.38 These instruments also assume a model 
of childhood based on the notion that children everywhere have the 
same basic needs, and that these can be met with a standard set of 
responses.39 International jurisprudence has added an interesting yet 
significant dimension to this conception of childhood: the agency of 
the child which stipulates a child’s right to be heard and taken seriously, 
to be an active participant in issues that concerns it and recognition of 
34 In several parts of Europe and the United States, children work for pay, particularly 
in seasonal activities, street trades, small workshops and at home. B Creighton 
‘Combating child labour: The role of international labour standards’ (1996–1997) 
18 Comparative Labour Law Journal 362 364.
35 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 140.
36 Due to the labour migration and Western influences, African families who have 
moved to urban areas have adopted this kind of social structure, although they still 
maintain some links (even if limited) with their extended family remaining in the 
rural areas.
37 S Wise & A Sanson ‘Child care in cultural context: issues for new research’ (2000) 22 
Australian Institute of Family Studies 3.
38 As above.
39 V Pupavac ‘The infantilisation of the south and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’ (1998) 3 Human Rights Law Review 3.
       
a child’s evolving capacities. CRC’s provisions on respect for the views 
of the child, the child’s right to freedom of expression, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of association40 under-
line children’s status as individuals with fundamental human rights and 
views and feelings of their own.41
The social organisation of ethnic groups in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa from pre-colonial times to the present, however, tells of 
different social systems and ideas of child development. The African 
philosophy of existence can be summed up in Shona as ndiri nokuti tiri, 
uye nekuti tiri, neniwo ndir, meaning ‘I am because we are and because 
we are, therefore I am’. African societies are thus characterised by col-
lectivist or inter-dependent cultural scripts which stress the importance 
of kinship.42
At the heart of the African socio-political order lies the family, a unit 
which extends both vertically and horizontally.43 Family members are 
linked in strong reciprocal aid relationships which entail complex rights 
and responsibilities. African societies value collective goals highly, such 
as learning to live in harmony with one another, competent participa-
tion in social events, obedience to authority, and a co-operative and 
altruistic orientation.44
The indigenous cultures of these countries, therefore, do not view 
the individual as an autonomous being possessed of rights above and 
prior to society. Whatever the specific social relations, such societies 
conceive of the individual as an integral part of a greater whole: the 
family within which each has a defined role and status.45 Such a system 
tends to stress duties rather than rights.46 Society would deem invoking 
one’s rights as anti-social behaviour. Indeed, each person is expected to 
compromise personal interests for the good of the community. From 
infancy, this sense of sacrifice is instilled in everyone.47
These ideas of development define childhood and express beliefs 
about children’s nature, what they are capable of doing and how they 
40 Arts 12, 13, 14 & 15.
41 This illustrates the complexity of the child labour discourse whereby one has to 
balance protecting the child from abuse and exploitation while promoting and 
respecting the child’s right to self-determination. R Hodgkin & P Newel Implementa-
tion handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2001) 149. 
42 JAM Cobbah ‘African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective’ 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 309 320. 
43 TW Bennett Human rights and African customary law under the South African Constitu-
tion (1995) 5.
44 Wise & Sanson (n 37 above) 3; W Ncube Law, culture, tradition and children’s rights 
in Eastern and Southern Africa (1998) 203.
45 RT Nhlapo ‘International protection of human rights and the family: African varia-
tions on a common theme’ (1989) 3 International Journal of Law and the Family 1 
4.
46 AA An-Na’im & FM Deng (eds) Human rights in Africa: Cross-cultural perspectives 
(1990) 16.
47 As above.
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should be integrated into society.48 African societies deem childhood 
as a time for learning, character building and acquiring the social and 
technical skills necessary to perform the future roles of adulthood. Chil-
dren represent lineage continuity and, most importantly, the material 
survival of families and the community at large.
Colonial influences did little to alter traditional thinking. Even after 
the independence of African countries, the notion of the primacy of 
the group and the submission of the individual persisted.49 Today, 
African children are still considered to have a responsibility to work for 
the cohesion and sustenance of their families, to put their physical and 
intellectual abilities at the service of their communities and to preserve 
cultural values in their relations with others.50
In this regard, an African girl child has the duty to clean the house, 
cook, fetch firewood, wash clothes and take care of younger siblings. 
All these burdens are meant to prepare her for motherhood. The boy 
child has the duty to work in the fields, to harvest and to herd livestock. 
These jobs are meant to groom the children to play appropriate roles 
when they become adults. In addition, however, both boys and girls 
work to contribute to the sustenance of the family. Although, today, 
some traditional ideals may have been lost or modified, particularly 
in urban areas, the duty to contribute to the survival of the family and 
community remains.51
At first glance one could say that CRC accepts this diversity of cultures, 
since it places a considerable emphasis on non-discrimination and the 
importance of children’s cultural rights.52 It also calls for respect for 
the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or the members of 
48 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 32.
49 This led to African support for collective rights and for restrictions on individual 
rights in the interest of the community, as well as for an emphasis on responsibilities. 
A Pollis & P Schwab Human rights: Cultural and ideological perspectives (1979) 8-9.
50 Art 31 African Children’s Charter.
51 It may be noted at this point that practical experience also demonstrates the existence 
of an international divide between rich and poor societies, according to which the 
industrialised countries of Europe and North America (and often Western-educated 
elites in poorer countries) tend to conceive of childhood and raise their children dif-
ferently than the less economically developed societies of Africa, Asia and elsewhere. 
Those in developing countries often reject Western-influenced international child 
labour standards because the views of children and childhood implicit in such stan-
dards do not adequately fit in with the realities of developing countries. WE Myers 
‘Considering child labour: Changing terms, issues and actors at the international 
level’ (1999) 6 Childhood 13; see also T Nhenga ‘International prohibition on child 
labour in an African perspective: Lesotho, Zimbabwe and South Africa’ unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2008 156-180.
52 Art 31: ‘(1) States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to 
engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and 
to participate freely in cultural life and the arts. (2) States Parties shall respect and 
promote the right of the child to participate fully in cultural and artistic life and shall 
encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, 
recreational and leisure activity.’
       
the extended family or community, as provided for by local custom, 
to provide appropriate direction and guidance in a child’s exercise of 
rights.53
On closer scrutiny, however, when describing the need for state 
members to ‘take all effective measures with a view to abolishing tradi-
tional practices prejudicial to the health of the child’, CRC acknowledges 
the potentially harmful effects of culture.54 The instrument is thus 
ambivalent on the role of culture in the lives of children. It sends mixed 
signals, thus obscuring these cultural practices to be condemned or 
condoned.55
The differences between the ideologies that informed human rights 
treaties and those of African cultures raise serious concerns. Can inter-
national human rights instruments, given the preconceptions of their 
drafters, apply effectively to peoples from different cultures? Can the 
latter peoples identify with the notions of child labour contained in the 
international instruments? If some cultures do not possess the con-
ception of children’s rights as enshrined in international instruments, 
should their customs and norms on child development be dismissed 
as bad?56
The best way to answer these questions is to consider child labour 
within the context of both cultural perspectives. This involves a criti-
cal analysis of the following issues: the period of life protected by law, 
child development and the conceptualisation of child labour.
2.1 Childhood
To determine who the law seeks to protect, one first has to deal with 
the question of childhood. At what age does childhood begin: at con-
ception, birth or infancy? What are its characteristics? Is its end marked 
by physical signs, individual accomplishments, rites of passage or the 
attainment of an arbitrarily fixed age?57 Is it a universal condition, or is 
the concept understood differently in different cultures and contexts? 
If it is not universally understood, can there be universal child labour 
standards?58
Most people distinguish a child from an adult by referring to physi-
cal differences and a power relationship. This distinction, however, is 
53 Art 5.
54 Art 24(3).
55 E Verhellen (ed) Understanding children’s rights (1996) 58.
56 Cobbah (n 42 above) 309.
57 The concept of child has sometimes been used to give information about certain 
relationships. Eg, regardless of how old we become, we will always be our parents’ 
children. Those who are born last will always be the ‘baby’ of the family, regardless 
of age, accomplishments or physical attributes. J Gabarino Children and families in 
the social environment (1992) 99.
58 KA Bentley ‘Can there be any universal children’s rights?’ (2005) 9 International 
Journal of Human Rights 107. 
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complicated by a diversity of possible relationships within each cul-
tural group.59 Societies have always had a ‘concept’ of childhood, but 
various ‘conceptions’ of this phenomenon vary in three basic ways, 
namely, the boundaries, dimensions and divisions. The boundary of 
childhood is the point at which it is considered to begin and end. A 
society nearly always has a formal division of roles and responsibili-
ties that amounts to the setting of a boundary between childhood and 
adulthood. Examples are rites of passage or initiation ceremonies which 
celebrate the end of childhood.60
The second way which conceptions of childhood may differ is in their 
dimensions. There are various vantage points from which to detect 
differences between children and adults. These include the moral or 
juridical angle from which persons may be deemed incapable, by vir-
tue of age, of being held accountable for their actions; the physical 
viewpoint from which persons, by virtue of their immaturity, are seen 
as lacking in adult reason or knowledge; and a political angle from 
which young humans are thought unable to contribute towards and 
participate in the running of society.
Other dimensions in the childhood discourse also exist. Some soci-
eties deem childhood to end at puberty, when humans are able to 
procreate, or at a time when individuals are capable of independently 
sustaining themselves. A person who is, therefore, juridically a child, 
will not necessarily be so from the point of view of reproductive capac-
ity or self-sufficiency.61
The third respect in which conceptions of childhood can differ is 
their divisions. The early life of a human being may be subdivided into 
a number of different periods and the category of childhood can bear 
different relations to these. Most cultures recognise a very early period 
of infancy, characterised as one of extreme vulnerability and depen-
dence upon adult care. A great deal of significance is often attached to 
weaning, because this tends to occur during the next pregnancy of the 
mother, and thus marks a point at which the young infant is about to 
be replaced as the object of close maternal attention. The acquisition 
of speech may also be another key point of transition.62
The conception of childhood reflected in international child rights 
instruments derives from seventeenth and eighteenth century philoso-
phers, notably John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Locke perceived 
children as ‘ignorant persons requiring literacy, education, reason, self-
59 In African cultures, eg, the duration of child dependence and subordination is not 
fixed. The age roles for all individuals also vary; A Fletcher & S Hussey (eds) Child-
hood in question: Children, parents and the state (1999) 32.
60 Hence, the various dimensions of childhood need not converge in defining one 




       
control and shame before they could be transformed into a civilised 
adult’.63 Locke said childhood was mainly something that had to be 
overcome, which offered opportunities, for a step-by-step conversion 
into maturity. Locke advocated the gradual hardening of children by 
subjecting them to cold baths, giving them leaky shoes, feeding them 
little meat and allowing them only adequate sleep.64
Rousseau, the French philosopher, proclaimed the necessity of the 
concept of childhood, but advocated a very different conception. To 
him, it was as a period of extreme weakness and vulnerability.65 He 
believed in the ‘spontaneity, purity, strength and joy of childhood’, and 
saw these as capacities to be celebrated.66 Rousseau regarded children 
as individuals in their own right, who deserved the freedom to express 
themselves. As far as he was concerned, strict supervision and structure 
were unnecessary for the successful development of a child.67 Instead, 
he demanded that education recognises its identity and peculiar 
nature. Rousseau’s romantic perception of the child was a major factor 
in paving the way for modern ideas of child development which are, 
reflected in international instruments on children’s rights.68
Today, the significance of childhood is well pronounced in modern 
societies which perceive it as a period of extended economic depen-
dence, protected innocence and weakness, and rapid learning which 
is achieved through universal schooling. During this period, the child 
is largely separated from economic and community life.69 The term 
‘child’ is based on the notion that young persons are vulnerable both 
in the physical and mental senses, and hence ‘suffer’ from immaturity, 
a weak intellect and the incapacity to make decisions that are in their 
interests.70 Here children are depicted as helpless (or potential victims), 
dependent on adult protection.
This notion of childhood is historically and anthropologically 
unusual, not only for the radical division it draws between childhood 
and adulthood, but also for valuing children’s helplessness rather than 
usefulness. It extends their dependency to an advanced age by delib-
erately delaying instruction in certain life skills, notably, the making 
of a living or the raising of a family. Such a view of childhood leaves 
63 He believed that children could not participate as full citizens as they did not have the 
requisite rationality to exercise their natural freedom and rights. S Lugtig ‘A review of 
David Archard’s Children: Rights and childhood’ (1996) 41 Mcgill Law Journal 893.
64 L Abernethie ‘Child labour in contemporary society: Why do we care?’ (1998) 6 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 81 87.
65 ‘Child psychology’ University of Kansas http://www.kuce.org/isc/previews/ psyc/
psyc333_lesson.html (accessed 16 October 2005).
66 Abernethie (n 64 above) 87.
67 Curator ‘Centuries of childhood’, Kent University Museum http://dept.kent.edu/
museum/ exhibit/kids/kids.html (accessed 16 October 2005).
68 Abernethie (n 64 above) 87-88.
69 Archard (n 60 above) 39.
70 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 27; Archard (n 60 above) 37.
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children largely free of responsibility.71 In line with this conception, 
children must spend their time in school, with time for leisure and 
play. Although economically dependent, children are also considered 
capable of handling certain aspects of social and political autonomy, 
fostered by education and health systems that stress individual rights 
and responsibilities.
The modern conception of childhood has two key features. The first is 
a rigid hierarchy, which separates children from adults by special dress, 
games, language and behaviour. The second is the idea of childhood 
innocence, whereby a childhood must be both happy and separated 
from the corrupt world. This is expressed in the child-centred family 
which is determined materially, if in no other way, to make these the 
‘best years of life’.72
As a result of this paternalistic conception, adults monopolise the 
determination of what is in the best interests of the child under the sup-
position that childhood, by definition, makes children ill-suited to make 
rational, reasonable and wise decisions.73 As a result of a supposed 
mental immaturity, children are denied legal capacity, and are placed 
under parental responsibility so that they may not execute juristic acts, 
administer their own affairs or enter into contracts without assistance.74 
It is from this conception of childhood that the view arises that children 
are to be protected against exhausting, unhealthy labour and that they 
have a right to care, education and, more generally, their own social 
environment.75
The ILO Conventions and CRC define a child as ‘every human being 
below the age of 18 years’. CRC, however, goes on to provide that a 
child is a person under the age of 18 ‘unless under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier’.76 The African Children’s Char-
ter, on the other hand, simply states that a child is ‘every human being 
below the age of 18 years’.77 The ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention also defines a child as one who is below the age of 18. The 
African Children’s Charter and the ILO Convention therefore leave no 
allowance for variation.
71 WE Myers ‘Appreciating diverse approaches to child labour’ presentation during the 
symposium ‘Child Labour and the Globalising Economy: Lessons from Asia/Pacific 
Countries’ 7-9 February 2001, Child Labour website http://www.childlabor.org/
symposium/myers.htm (accessed 5 October 2006). 
72 A Fyfe Child labour (1989) 13.
73 Ncube (n 44 above) 17.
74 As above.
75 It is clear that these prescriptions have been codified into international standards 
and domestic legislation. Eg, arts 19, 24, 28, 31, 32 & 36 of CRC; secs 28(e) & (f) 
of the Constitution of South Africa; sec 43 of the South African Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
76 Art 1 CRC. 
77 Art 2 African Children’s Charter.
       
The arbitrary setting of the upper age limit for childhood at 18 by 
the African Children’s Charter78 and the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention79 is problematic when applied to African cultures where 
the determinants of adulthood are both biologically and socially con-
structed.80 International agencies and industrialised countries use this 
yardstick of modernity as a tool to condemn those countries with a 
high incidence of child labour as ‘backward’ and ‘undemocratic’.81
While international law marks the end of childhood at a certain age, 
in Africa the movement of individuals through childhood is not marked 
by arbitrary fixed ages, but by rites of passage that lack chronological 
specificity.82 Thus, the African conception of childhood depends, to 
a very large extent, upon the social, economic and cultural dynamics 
of a given society. In pre-colonial Africa, ‘[childhood was] marked by 
factors that had more to do with the biology or physical development, 
ability, the purpose for which a definition of childhood or adulthood 
[was] sought and status, rather than with the number of years a person 
has lived’.83
African societies deemed childhood as a period of ‘training’, as evi-
denced by the persistent demands of adults on children to perform 
arduous tasks to ‘toughen them’, in preparation for their entry into the 
harsh world of adulthood.84 It was also perceived in terms of intergen-
erational obligations of support and reciprocity.85 A child in this sense 
was always a child, in relation to his or her parents, who expected, and 
were traditionally entitled to, all forms of support in times of need. For 
instance, a Shona child always had the duty to look after its parents if 
they were incapable of taking care of themselves.86
78 Art 2 African Children’s Charter.
79 Art 2 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention.
80 Refer to the ‘African conception’ of child above.
81 O Nieuwenhuys ‘The paradox of child labour and anthropology’ (1996) 25 Annual 
Review of Anthropology 237 246.
82 Women and Law in Southern Africa ‘Towards a cultural understanding of the inter-
play between children’s rights and women’s rights: An Eastern and Southern African 
perspective’ Working Paper 11, February 1995 7.
83 Age was treated as an approximate benchmark, not an exact record. Ncube (n 44 
above) 100. The arbitrary fixing of the age of majority by a legal fiction is thus prob-
lematic in African countries where the conception of childhood differs radically from 
the Western notion embodied in international human rights instruments. Women 
and Law in Southern Africa (n 82 above) 7.
84 Bhaca girls, eg, from an early age took an active part in the housework of the kraal 
and learned the essential feminine techniques of grinding, cooking and field-work. 
Young boys learned how to handle livestock, treat their diseases and assist them 
when giving birth. P Alston (ed) The best interests of child: Reconciling culture and 
human rights (1994) 90; WD Hammond-Tooke Bhaca society: A people of the Transke-
ian Uplands South Africa (1962) 77.
85 Ncube (n 44 above) 12.
86 This may be the same in some Western cultures, but it is not a practice socially 
expected. JF Holleman Shona customary law with reference to kinship, marriage, the 
family and the estate (1969) 62.
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African childhood was also a period of internalised and rigorously-
enforced obedience to authority. The Shona maintained strict discipline, 
and disobedience attracted corporal punishment.87 This notion implied 
that the family not only managed the training and socialisation of chil-
dren into adulthood, but that it also had the right to determine the 
tasks, traditions and customs which had to be complied with before 
‘childhood’ in its narrower sense ended.
As in most societies, however, the African concept of ‘child’ is both 
biologically and socially constructed, depending largely on the pur-
pose for which a definition of childhood is sought.88 In the biological 
sense, a child is any person who is born to another:89
I am my father and mother’s child … regardless of my age and station in 
life. To my father and mother I am always their child and in some respects 
forever subject to their authority or advice or guidance for so long as they 
are alive.
In a social sense, a woman may remain a child all of her life. For instance, 
according to Sesotho culture, she may not be an autonomous indi-
vidual without reference to her father, husband or other male extended 
family members.90
Some African societies tie the concept of a child to the physical ability 
to carry out specific tasks. These decisions are influenced by any of sev-
eral factors, which may include economic status, level of education or 
location (rural or urban). Persons from families of meagre means and 
low educational status are deemed by their societies to reach adult-
hood earlier than those of economically affluent and educated ones.91
Most African societies mark the end of childhood when new eco-
nomic responsibilities are acquired and entrance into the institution of 
marriage takes place.92 Others use initiation. A Xhosa male child, for 
example, does not become an adult until he has gone through all the 
circumcision rituals, during which he has to spend several days in the 
bush fending for himself through hunting and gathering.93 Any man 
who has not gone through this process will be derogatorily referred to 
as a ‘child’ and regarded for all intents and purposes as such.’94 Even 
after this, however, full adulthood is not attained until he has married 
87 As above.
88 Ncube (n 44 above) 100.
89 As above.
90 As above.
91 Ncube (n 44 above) 207.
92 As above.
93 Hammond-Tooke (n 84 above) 77.
94 As above.
       
and established a family.95 From this perspective, childhood is a state 
of being unmarried.96
The problem with the contemporary ideal of childhood is that it denies 
children’s agency in work,97 yet CRC itself and the African Children’s 
Charter both recognise childhood not only as a period of protection, 
but also as one where the agency of the child is upheld.98 Moreover, 
doubt may be thrown on the developmental and moral validity of a 
model of childhood, which excludes children from participation in 
matters that are social and economic. What is the value of isolating and 
institutionalising children in schools buffered from the important reali-
ties of life? The rationale of CRC, however, is that, irrespective of the 
level of development of a country, children must have a childhood of 
dependency during which they are empowered with rights, and social 
policy must be re-orientated to ensure that their best interests are the 
primary concern.99
One may argue that the ‘protective view’ of childhood evident in 
international instruments has resulted from a combination of circum-
stances in the first world that are not part of the experience of most 
developing countries. The construction of childhood reflected particu-
larly in the ILO Conventions arose in the particular circumstances of the 
developed countries, late in their industrialisation, which consequently 
led to the removal of children from the labour market into education. 
International law thus unfairly requires developing countries to adopt 
this model of childhood, although without the industrialisation and 
development that prompted its evolution to what it is ‘demanded’ to 
be today – a period of dependency and protection.100
2.2 Child development
The whole discussion of childhood and child labour is centred on the 
‘development of the child’. Childhood is the first stage of development 
in the life of a human being, and labour is deemed to be detrimental 
to that stage of development. But what do we mean by ‘development 
95 R Macmillan & R Copher ‘Families in the life course: Interdependency of roles, role 
configurations, and pathways’ (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and the Family 858 
868-75.
96 In the same way that societies may consider a person over the age of 18 as a child, 
either socially or biologically, they may also deem a person below that age as an 
adult. Examples of such are a ‘child chief’, a ‘child parent’ or a ‘child spouse’. They 
fall in the category of parent or adult by virtue of having the same name of an ances-
tral spirit, by procreation or by marital status. In all these instances, the society may 
accord the child the status of an adult in the position so appointed or attained. 
Women and Law in Southern Africa (n 82 above) 7. 
97 As above.
98 Chirwa (n 22 above) 160.
99 Art 3(1) CRC.
100 HJ Steiner & P Alston International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals 
(2000) 517-518.
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of the child’? Who determines the ‘development of the child’? What 
criteria are to be used? When one talks about work that is ‘detrimental 
to the development’ of the child, what dimension of development is 
being referred to?
The theory of child development, as embodied in international law, 
is built on a belief that it is in the best interests of the child to be eco-
nomically dependent, at least until a specified minimum age, school 
being a more appropriate context for growth and development than 
work.101 Initially, this idea of a universal process of development may 
be appealing.102 To embrace it blindly, however, would be to ignore 
the fact that different societies have their own ideas about children’s 
capacities and vulnerabilities, the ways in which a child learns and 
develops, and what is good or bad for them.
As already illustrated above, different cultures place significance on 
differing stages of a child’s growth, which may be marked by chrono-
logical age, by physical abilities, biological changes, and such. Each 
stage will have different implications for the child. Children thrive, and 
indeed flourish, in widely-contrasting conditions and circumstances, 
and they have different capacities and needs, to which the universal 
child development model is insensitive. Although this model draws on 
supposedly ‘scientific’ principles, we have no conclusive evidence that 
it suits children’s interests better than other cultural models or as a mat-
ter of fact produces happier and better-adjusted children.103
2.3 Child labour
Having identified the various conceptions of child and childhood, and 
acknowledged that any such conception is both problematic and vari-
able, we now turn to the concept of child labour and its application to 
African societies. One of the initial problems associated with the regula-
tion of child labour is the difficulty in defining the scope of behaviour 
that requires regulation. Two distinct discourses in the historical lit-
erature use the term child labour in very different ways. One body of 
work defines a child as anyone under a certain age, and it applies ‘child 
labour’ to any work done by such people. The other deems child labour 
101 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 27.
102 Eg, ‘[d]efining development in terms of progressive stages fits the empirical obser-
vation that children everywhere grow bigger and stronger with age and master 
new skills and new insights daily. It also seems to make feasible the measurement 
of developmental progress in individual children thought the application of behav-
ioural and developmental tests.’ Boyden et al (n 5 above) 31.
103 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 39; Hanson & Vandaele (n 4 above) 120; J Gallinetti ‘Worst 
forms of child labour: A view from out of Africa’ in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children’s 
rights in Africa: A legal perspective (2008) 327.
       
on family establishments as a contribution by children of whatever age 
to that economy, and, as such, perfectly acceptable.104
It would not be surprising, therefore, if a group of people discuss-
ing the phenomenon were each to have different ideas of what the 
term meant. The various definitions are all products of political settle-
ments, which are themselves the result of social, cultural, political and 
economic positions taken by states and the other actors that draft the 
provisions of international law.105 Such diversity in the understanding 
of child labour leaves one in a quandary as to the precise evil the law 
seeks to abolish.
No single international instrument explicitly defines child labour. The 
ILO Conventions mainly approach child labour in terms of minimum 
ages of employment. CRC views it not according to the activity, but 
according to the effect of the activity on the child concerned. It deems 
any labour unacceptable, if it is detrimental to the development of the 
child, regardless of whether it takes place in a workplace or at home.106 
The African Children’s Charter merely prohibits the economic exploita-
tion of a child and any work which has the same elements as those 
prohibited under CRC.107 This clear lack of consistency in the definition 
of child labour in international law thus complicates its application in 
traditional African societies.
These provisions of international law do not describe a single phe-
nomenon. To the contrary, the definitions imply quite dissimilar notions 
about what is problematic about child labour, and, in consequence, 
lead to divergent policies for addressing the issue. The key phrases that 
seem to recur are: ‘too much work’, ‘too young an age’, ‘hazardous 
to morality and health’, ‘harmful to development’, ‘exploitation’ and 
‘interference with education’. These concepts themselves, however, 
are subject to different interpretations as will be illustrated below.
Due to a lack of a concise definition of child labour, international 
organisations (such as the ILO and the United Nations Children’s Emer-
gency Fund (UNICEF)), trade unions and other interest groups have 
attempted to fill in this lacuna by coming up with their own definitions. 
They have therefore defined child labour by juxtaposing it with child 
work, by using age boundaries, by the nature of the work, by its impact 
104 H Cunningham ‘The decline of child labour: Labour markets and family economies 
in Europe and North America since 1830’ (2000) 3 Economic History Review 409 
410.
105 H Cullen Role of international law in the elimination of child labour (2007) 22; C Breen 
‘The role of NGOs in the formulation of and compliance with the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 453. 
106 Art 32 of CRC provides: ‘States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected 
from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be haz-
ardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health 
or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.’ 
107 Art 15 African Children’s Charter.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHILD LABOUR 179
       
180 (2010) 10 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
on the health, development and morals of the child, by the hours spent, 
by the effect on education, and by the economic benefits accruing to 
the child or third persons. A closer scrutiny of some of these ways of 
defining child labour is therefore necessary.
2.3.1 Labour/work dichotomy
The view that not all work is unacceptable has received universal 
agreement. Human rights bodies have traditionally found child labour 
harmful and ‘child work’ acceptable.108 UNICEF makes a distinction 
between ‘dangerous and exploitative work’ and ‘beneficial work’.109 
Dangerous and exploitative work is that which is carried out full-time 
and at too early an age. The working day is too long; it is carried out 
in inadequate conditions; it is not sufficiently paid; it involves excessive 
responsibility; and it undermines the child’s dignity and self-esteem. 
Such is child labour.110 Beneficial work, on the other hand, is that which 
promotes or stimulates a child’s physical, cognitive and social devel-
opment without interfering with scholastic or recreational activity, or 
rest.111
According to the ILO, child work refers to adult-guided activities that 
focus on the child’s growth and enculturation into the family and soci-
ety. Child work is, therefore, developmental in nature.112 The dichotomy 
between child work and child labour is, however, problematic in that 
many people use the terms interchangeably. Both are born of the ubiq-
uitous human need to survive. They are interactions requiring physical 
and mental effort, and they are means of acquiring resources.113 Much 
of the ambiguity centres on these common features.
The definition of work most often used in surveys and censuses is 
largely based on participation in the wage labour force, while most 
children’s work occurs outside this sector. The ILO’s estimate of the 
number of labouring children is in most cases based on wage labour 
108 ‘The distinction between work and labour is to be found in a critical overview of 
the climate in which these processes operate and the quality of the relationships in 
operation.’ SN Mishra & S Mishra Tiny hands in unorganised sector: Towards elimina-
tion of child labour (2004) 15.
109 UNICEF is an organ of the UN mandated by the UN General Assembly to advocate 
the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their 
opportunities to reach their full potential. UNICEF is guided by CRC and strives to 
establish children’s rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards 
of behaviour towards children.
110 E Ochaita et al ‘Child work and labour in Spain: A first approach’ (2000) 8 Interna-
tional Journal of Children’s Rights 15 19; ‘Child protection from violence, exploitation 
and abuse’ UNICEF website http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_childlabour.
html (accessed 18 June 2008).
111 Ochaita (n 110 above) 19.
112 National Research Council of the National Academies Monitoring international labour 
standards: Techniques and sources of information (2004) 169.
113 Mishra & Mishra (n 108 above) 15.
       
statistics supplied by member countries. The criterion most frequently 
used to define unpaid activities as ‘work’ is whether or not the activity 
contributes to production. Measuring children’s productive output, 
however, has proved to be difficult, since, in many cases, their contri-
bution is indirect. For example, are boys who spend their days playing 
in the fields and scaring away birds working? Neither they nor their 
parents may perceive the activity as work, yet it may have a positive 
effect on farm productivity.114 Definitions of work, particularly chil-
dren’s work, are highly variable and differ according to cultural and 
economic circumstances.
An emphasis on the distinction between work and labour may be 
useful if one is looking for a way to ban some forms of child labour and 
accept others.115 The reality in some traditional African societies is that 
most child activities are a combination of work and labour, in varying 
degrees of each, depending upon the quality of relationships involved. 
For instance, a girl doing domestic chores in her own home or in a 
foster arrangement may fall into either the work or labour categories, 
depending on her relationship with the guardians she is living with. 
One thus cannot determine the point at which acceptable work shifts 
to child labour. It must also be noted that the criteria used to determine 
child work and child labour change across time, place and culture and 
vary according to different conceptions of childhood.116
The work-labour distinction also implies that all profit-motivated 
activity is harmful and all gratuitous activity benign. It does not consider 
children in family situations as exploited. This understanding of labour 
implies that it is paid employment, whereas a great deal of children’s 
work is not remunerated and is not productive.117
Another problem with the distinction between labour and work is 
its focus on abstract definitions, which distracts from the activities of 
children in practice and from the situations in which these activities 
are performed. Once something is classified as child labour, it is iden-
tified as bad, and therefore to be abolished. It evokes an emotional 
reaction rather than a careful consideration of the actual situation of 
the child.118
Unless children are looked at within a proper context, however, there 
are bound to be misunderstandings in defining child labour.119 Recent 
114 Eg, are boys who spend their day playing in the fields and scaring away birds work-
ing? They may not perceive their activity as work, nor may their parents, yet it may 
have a positive effect on productivity. G Rodgers & G Standing (eds) Child work, 
poverty and underdevelopment (1981) 91.
115 JC Andvig ‘Child labour in sub-Saharan Africa: An exploration’ (1998) 2 Forum for 
Development Studies 327 328.
116 Abernethie (n 64 above) 91-99.
117 As above.
118 MFC Bourdillon (ed) Earning a life: Working children in Zimbabwe (2000) 9.
119 As above.
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studies on child development suggest that children’s ability to work, 
and to benefit or suffer from it, varies significantly from child to child. 
The new research also shows that child work has many effects, some 
good and some bad, not all of which can be separated from each oth-
er.120 Even so, evidence about the impact of child work is fragmentary. 
There are few studies using case controls to show the long-term impact 
of early work or its relative severity. The studies that do exist rarely 
examine the psychological costs or benefits of work, and much of what 
is written focuses on the potential hazards rather than the actual harm 
that occurs.121
In general, international law’s attempt to neatly separate child work 
from child labour is the basis of stereotyping and prejudice. If we find 
the criteria for deciding in advance whether a particular activity is to 
be classified as work or labour, we are considering whether the activ-
ity should be permitted or not, before examining the advantages and 
disadvantages for the children concerned.122
2.3.2 Minimum age of employment
The ILO approaches child labour according to minimum ages. The 
whole concept of establishing minimum age reflects the concern that 
children of too young an age should be specially protected. Prior to the 
1860s, the Western world did not consider age as an important measure 
for the acceptability of child work, and, at that time, the employment 
of nine year-olds (and below) was legal and common place.123 Rather 
than establishing age limits, however, nineteenth century child labour 
legislation reduced hours of work and provided some education for 
child labourers.124
With changes in the conception of childhood, the early twentieth 
century saw the ILO setting age limits for the employment of children 
in various sectors of the economy. The age limits in the Minimum Age 
Convention of 1973 still form the basis for international and national 
legislation. The Convention compels countries to fix a minimum age 
for employment that must not be less than the age for completing 
compulsory schooling.125 The instrument sets the minimum age of 
120 SL Bachman ‘A new economics of child labor: Searching for answer behind the head-
lines’ (2000) 53 Journal of International Affairs 545 554.
121 As above. 
122 Bourdillon (n 118 above) 10. 
123 VA Zelizer Pricing the priceless child. The changing social value of children (1985) 75.
124 An example was the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act of 1802 in Great Britain, 
which outlawed night work and attempted to limit the working day in cotton mills. 
A subsequent Act of 1819 forbade the employment of children under the age of nine 
in cotton mills. Fyfe (n 72 above) 30; Zelizer (n 123 above) 75.
125 For developed countries, it should not be less than 15 years (art 2 para 3). Develop-
ing countries may set the minimum age at 14 (art 2 para 4). 
       
employment at 15.126 Developing countries may set the minimum age 
at 14.127 Domestic limitations on age vary according to the nature of 
the work, and the so-called ‘development of the child’ and educational 
obligations.128
The Minimum Age Convention also provides that national laws or 
regulations may permit the employment or work of persons between 
13 to 15 years of age on ‘light work’, which is129
not likely to be harmful to their health and development; and such as not 
to prejudice their attendance at school, their participation in vocational 
orientation or training programmes approved by the competent authority 
or their capacity to benefit from the instruction received.
This competent authority must determine what light work is, and pre-
scribe the number of hours and conditions in which such work may 
be undertaken. For dangerous work, the Convention sets a limit of 18 
and allows children aged 16 to undertake such work only if their safety 
and morals were fully protected and they received sufficient specific 
instruction or professional training.130
In determining whether work is ‘light’ or ‘likely to be harmful’, the 
ILO takes into consideration, among other factors, the duration of work, 
the conditions under which the work is done and its effect on school 
attendance. The ILO, however, does not provide any operational guid-
ance for assessing these factors and determining whether any given 
form of work would qualify as light or hazardous work. The type of 
work which falls under the rubric of light and hazardous is left to 
individual countries to determine. The comparison between light and 
hazardous work therefore remains unhelpful as it fails to provide any 
effective method of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of work.131
126 Art 2(3) Minimum Age Convention. Since the British Factory Acts of the 19th cen-
tury, compulsory education has proved to be one of the most effective means of 
combating child labour. International law reflects an acknowledgment of that fact. 
The age of admission to employment is thus inextricably linked to the age limit for 
compulsory education. The logic is that if compulsory schooling ends at the same 
time as the minimum age for employment, it removes the risk of children engaging 
in employment before they are legally entitled to work and rules out an enforced 
period of idleness. ILO: Minimum Age, General Survey of the Reports Relating to 
Convention No 138 and Recommendation No 146 Concerning Minimum Age, 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions and Rec-
ommendations, Report III (Part 4(B)), ILC, 67th session, Geneva, 1981, para 140.
127 Art 2(4) Minimum Age Convention. 
128 The Convention, however, provides flexibility for countries to establish a younger 
minimum age of 12 or 13 for children to partake in ‘light work’ (art 7). Hanson & 
Vandaele (n 4 above) 101.
129 Art 7(1) Minimum Age Convention. 
130 Arts 3(1) & (3) Minimum Age Convention.
131 J McKechnie & S Hobbs ‘Child labour: A global phenomenon?’ (1999) 8 Child Abuse 
Review 87 88.
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By implication, a child who is below the minimum ages stipulated by 
the Convention would be engaging in child labour if they do the work 
prohibited for their age. These minimum age standards express an 
ideal of childhood as ‘a privileged phase of life, properly dedicated only 
to play and schooling, and with an extended period of dependence 
during which economic activity is discouraged or actually denied’. It 
would seem that the Minimum Age Convention was motivated by an 
assumption that, if the minimum age were raised, the physical and 
mental development of children would be enhanced, since they would 
not be allowed to work until middle adolescence.
While it is generally conceded that minimum age laws have been 
effective in removing children from formal employment, an issue which 
has been well researched, it is, however, still unknown whether the 
laws have improved the development and the welfare of the children 
concerned. Minimum age regulations have not received a credible 
analysis that empirically weighs costs and benefits to determine their 
net impact on children and on society. This is astounding, considering 
that the minimum age policy has been in place for over 150 years, and 
the Minimum Age Convention for over 25 years.
An example of this oversight is in instances where children are 
orphaned due to HIV/AIDS or other reasons. Taking such children 
out of employment because they are under age would be counter-
productive as they will be left with no means of survival.132 Such a case 
of ‘misguided good intentions’ should be a warning about the costs of 
applying simplistic assumptions and solutions across the board with-
out adequate attention to differences of social and economic context.
One could also argue that regulating child labour by minimum age 
limitations would be problematic in countries which lack the institu-
tional wherewithal to register the birth of every child such as those of 
Africa. In such societies, age is thus difficult to prove. In any event, some 
child development experts believe that age is not always the best way 
to decide whether individual children are ready for work, or whether 
any particular kind of work is appropriate for a specific child.133 Several 
factors should be considered, such as the health and nutrition of the 
child and its living environment.
132 Authors argue that ‘a universalised standard excluding children below a particular 
age from employment or work as set out in article 2 of the [Minimum Age] Conven-
tion is unjustified … insufficient attempts have been made to determine the impact 
of setting a minimum age for admission to employment or work on children; and the 
effort of enforcingf “blanket prohibitions” affecting all work (even safe work) diverts 
attention away from the need to intervene in forms and conditions of work that are 
harmful to children’. M Bourdillon et al cited in Sloth-Nielsen (n 103 above) 328.
133 SL Bachman ‘The political economy of child labour and its impacts on interna-
tional business’ http://www.nabe.com/publib/be/000330.pdf#search=%22us%20
Dept.%20of%20Labour%20(1998)%20definition%20of%20child%20labour%22 
(accessed 19 September 2006).
       
Moreover, the ILO setting of specific age standards for children, the 
prescription of their participation in some spheres of activity whilst 
proscribing others, pathologises those child activities which take place 
outside the limits set for childhood. It is for this reason that activists 
and child development experts judge developing societies as having 
failed their children because the children’s lives do not conform to the 
image prescribed by international law. Consequently, the discourse of 
children’s rights suggests that the plight of children in the Third World 
‘is due to the moral failings of their societies’.134
2.3.3 Education
Child development experts and campaigners against child labour have 
thus often pointed out the negative correlation between child work and 
the right to education. The understanding of child labour as a practice 
harmful to a child’s intellectual development is thus a well-established 
belief that has its origins in the mid-nineteenth century. Compulsory 
education is thus considered as an effective way of putting into effect 
the minimum age standards for admission to employment.135
It is submitted, however, that the incompatibility of education and 
work is overstated, and the benefits of abandoning work for school-
ing overrated. History has shown that condemning all child work and 
compelling children to go to school without first securing viable alter-
natives have made them even more vulnerable to poverty.136 Moreover, 
a large number of children, particularly in Asia and Africa, manage to 
combine school and work effectively.137
Although full-time work (whether hazardous or not) is clearly incom-
patible with school attendance and performance, part-time child 
labour does not necessarily interfere with education when it occurs 
during vacations, or for a few hours a week during the academic 
year.138 Furthermore, there is no authoritative data based on empiri-
cal and scientific research to support the rhetoric about the dangers 
of combining all forms of work with education. One therefore has to 
be careful about making automatic assumptions that all child work 
impairs education and intellectual development.
Defining child labour as work that keeps children from school also 
creates the risk of over-estimating the harm of work and neglecting 
134 As above.
135 Art 28 CRC and art 2 of the Minimum Age Convention. Boyden et al (n 5 above) 
249-250.
136 As above.
137 Sixty million African children combine schooling and work. A Admassie ‘Explaining 
the high incidence of child labour in sub-Saharan Africa’ (2002) 14 African Develop-
ment Review 251 255. 
138 R Anker ‘The economics for child labour: A framework for measurement’ (2000) 139 
International Labour Review 257 261.
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the relevance of poor quality education in developing countries.139 The 
definition neglects the fact that schools can sometimes drive children 
of poverty-stricken families to labour. They are left with no option but 
to go out to earn money to help pay for school costs.140 Institutions, 
such as the missionary and farm schools of Southern Africa, have been 
known to actually perpetuate child labour rather than provide solu-
tions for it. Hordes of children in rural Zimbabwe, for instance, have 
to wake up early to work on commercial farms and plantations or for 
missionary enterprises in exchange for education. This brings into 
question all the rhetoric of the human rights movement on the benefits 
of education.
Another important question that arises with defining child labour 
as work that hampers schooling is the nature of education. More that 
one form of education exists. There is, first, formal education, which 
involves going to school and equipping the child with the necessary 
skills for formal employment. The second is traditional education, 
which includes an engagement in customary livelihood at home, in 
fields and forests with parents and communities.141
The model of education in international law also seems to carry with 
it an arrogantly negative perception of African cultural ways without 
acknowledging their benefits and does not take into account the exis-
tence of these different forms of education in African societies. They 
assume that a formal school is the only acceptable form of education. 
Southern African societies, however, consider child work an important 
component of education, especially in the household-based production 
system and various apprenticeship arrangements.142 Traditional educa-
tion includes engaging in customary livelihoods at home, in fields and 
pastures with parents and communities.143 The basic skills transmitted 
do indeed allow children to mature in a protective environment, at the 
same time preparing them for survival in an often harsh world.144
Admittedly, the global fruits of formal schooling have been consider-
able. Notwithstanding this, schooling should not be viewed uncritically, 
since it is eventually ‘limited by technology of the classroom, formal 
instruction and uniform stages of progression, prescribed knowledge, 
a curriculum of self-contained bits and by the restricted amount of time 
139 C Heady ‘What is the effect of child labour on learning achievement? Evidence from 
Ghana’ UNICEF Innocenti Working Papers (2000) 79. 
140 Anker (n 138 above) 261.
141 PB Larsen ‘Indigenous and tribal children: Assessing child labour and education 
challenges’ Child labour and Education Working Paper, International Programme 
on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/stan-
dards/ipec/publ/download/edu_indigenous_2003_ en.pdf (accessed 21 September 
2006).
142 Rodgers & Standing (n 114 above) 33.
143 Larsen (n 141above).
144 As above.
       
children actually spend at school’.145 In other words, education has not 
been fine-tuned to suit local circumstances.
When considering schools as routes to education and development, 
two major issues need to be taken into account. Firstly, given the mul-
tiplicity of values and goals of development in the world today, it is not 
evident that school alone can satisfy children’s many developmental 
capacities and needs. Secondly, it is questionable whether the kind 
of schooling on offer in many parts of the world is of much benefit 
to children. It may be that, in some cases, work has a more positive 
developmental effect, especially on the psychological well-being of the 
child.146
2.3.4 The health risks to child development
International law also approaches child labour with reference to the 
effects work may have on a child’s health, on the assumption that 
labour is harmful to the health and life expectancy of children.147 His-
torians acknowledge that during the industrial revolution in Europe, 
working children suffered permanent damage to their health as a 
direct consequence of their early experiences when they worked long 
hours without rest and were exposed to dangerous substances and 
machinery.148
However, it is quite apparent that the rhetoric relating work to 
child development deals superficially with physical health and safety, 
which include all the bodily senses required to survive in the journey 
to adulthood.149 Little is known about the developmental and health 
effects of work and what makes work abuse for children and the cul-
tural (and social and economic) forces that provoke and sustain that 
abuse. Scholars pay attention only to the hazards of work. There is little 
consideration of the possible benefits of work on child development. 
As a result, human rights activists and child development experts con-
demn the African way of raising children without understanding why 
child work in such societies continues to be an integral part of human 
development.
The drafters of international law, particularly ILO Conventions, seem 
to confuse hazards or risks with actual effects. While children should be 
protected from dangerous work and not be encouraged to endure haz-
ards, merely because they are resilient, the mere presence of risk tells 
us very little about the precise outcome of work for children. Exposure 
to a hazard does not necessarily have damaging consequences. Much 
145 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 58.
146 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 110.
147 Art 32(1) CRC; arts 3 & 7 Minimum Age Convention; and art 3 Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention.
148 Nhenga (n 51 above) 19.
149 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 29-39.
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depends on the social and normative context of work, the nature and 
severity of the hazard and how children respond individually.150
Questions also remain as to how to quantify the amount of time a child 
needs for rest, leisure and play, on who determines how much time a 
child may work and on which factors shall inform the decision as to the 
appropriate number of hours that may be allocated to child activities. 
Given differences in children’s physical capabilities and adaptations, it 
is difficult to answer these questions. International and domestic instru-
ments on children’s rights do not provide any guidelines and thus the 
answers will inevitably be based on subjective deduction.151
The child development experts’ assumption that most children’s 
work is grim, distasteful and stultifying to their development has seri-
ously distorted both national and international activities dealing with it. 
Experts have usually placed the emphasis on physical and safety issues, 
and on the adverse effects on schooling, while largely ignoring psycho-
social effects which mitigate against detrimental outcomes, contribute 
to a child’s resilience and facilitate development. It can actually bring 
important rewards, such as teaching children endurance, giving them a 
sense of pride and self-worth, and making self-sufficiency possible.152
The contemporary theory of development is thus restrictive in that it 
overlooks the existence of the social and moral dimensions of human 
development, which include concern for others, sharing, a sense of 
belonging, the ability to co-operate, the distinction between right and 
wrong, respect for laws and for the property and persons of others, 
resourcefulness and other capacities needed to live successfully within 
a social context.153 Little attention is paid to emotional development, 
which relates to adequate self-esteem, family attachment, feelings of 
love, acceptance and the affection necessary to maintain family ties.154 
Such dimensions of development may be enhanced by child work, and 
are essential in African cultures. Moreover, there are so many kinds of 
work and working conditions, some facilitating and some hindering 
children’s growth, that it is presumptuous to make blanket judgments 
about the morality of child work and the legal standards involved.
The limits of culture must, however, be noted. Just as culture should 
not be excluded from the human rights equation, so too must it not be 
used consistently to trump rights. Indeed, there are cultural practices, 
which, by today’s standards, are difficult to justify, for instance, taking 
the girl child out of school because she is to be married.155 Such limits 
on culture, however, seem to have driven the international campaign 
against child labour to seek the denial of all cultural practices and atti-
150 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 79.
151 As above.
152 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 144 110.
153 As above.
154 As above.
155 Alston (n 84 above) 20.
       
tudes. Notable amongst these are the expectation that children will 
contribute economically to their families, and the belief that children 
working is an appropriate preparation for adulthood. While such Afri-
can attitudes can indeed significantly perpetuate child labour, they 
cannot, with their associated practices, be entirely condemned.156
African attitudes exist in a wide variety of forms, not all of which can 
necessarily be linked to exploitative types of child labour. Modifying 
the forms of those cultural attitudes and practices, therefore, should be 
a finely-nuanced, context-specific task. The ways and degree to which 
children are expected to contribute to their families, the best mix of 
formal education, paid employment and apprenticeship to prepare 
children for adulthood, and the appropriate way to handle biologically 
and culturally-gendered differences are intrinsically context-oriented 
decisions. Hence, any attempt to modify them should be sufficiently 
local to take account of the circumstances in which they occur and per-
haps in consideration of the evolving capacities of the child.157 Further, 
decisions about such matters would normally fall within the spheres 
of family privacy, religious liberty and cultural autonomy. Hence, 
attempts to modify those attitudes coercively or without sensitivity to 
local conditions are likely to be met with resistance.158
While the cultural differences in child rearing seem obvious at first 
glance, these differences are often not recognised by those charged 
with implementing the law, as they apply ‘scientific’ ways of approach-
ing problems. The economic, social and political conditions for urban, 
middle class individuals who shape policy and programming, often 
differ dramatically from those on the receiving end: the rural folk. 
This expert knowledge is often derived from a conceptual basis that 
denigrates local knowledge and traditional wisdom. Local practices 
are frequently defined as harmful without appreciating the meaning 
of harm.159
2.3.5 African countries’ ratification of international child labour 
instruments
Given the above discussion, the question at this point would be: How 
is it that African countries have ratified CRC and the ILO Conventions 
on child labour if the principles enshrined therein are so at odds with 
the cultures of their constituencies? Answering these questions would 
require one to look to the states’ reasons for ratification and the nature 
156 DM Smolin ‘Conflict and ideology in the international campaign against child 
labour’ (1999) 16 Hofstra Labour and Employment Law Journal 401-402.
157 The challenge, however, would be how to effectively and objectively assess the 
capacities of each child.
158 As above.
159 Verhellen (n 55 above) 59. 
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of the said countries’ participation at the negotiation and drafting 
stages of the Conventions.
True as it may be that African countries have ratified the international 
laws on children’s rights, it is well known that the motivation for the 
ratification is always a combination of various factors, with international 
diplomacy being a primary consideration. States always want to be 
seen as supporters of human rights. While some have ratified human 
rights treaties with the genuine intention to establish a universal nor-
mative framework and strengthen such a system worldwide, there is 
also evidence that developing countries simply succumbed to political 
pressure to ratify from other states and international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).160
Some countries have ratified human rights instruments to facilitate 
reintegration into the international community after a period of isola-
tion, symbolising a break with an authoritarian past or to prevent a 
recurrence of wide-scale human rights abuses. An example of countries 
which have done so is South Africa at the demise of apartheid in 1994, 
and Zimbabwe and Namibia after their independence in 1980 and 1990 
respectively.161 It is also common knowledge that developing countries 
have often ratified a human rights instrument for the sole purpose of 
receiving international aid. Governments that have ratified treaties for 
such reasons often lack a moral motivation to improve the lives of their 
citizens as they are obliged under the instruments and hence reduce 
the ratification to a mere academic exercise. As a consequence, most 
countries never bother to incorporate the treaties into domestic law.
One could also argue that during the drafting and negotiation of 
all human rights treaties, just about all delegates in attendance are 
usually more concerned with protecting the official positions of their 
governments with expedient ambiguity, than with achieving concep-
tual clarity, let alone representing beliefs, attitudes and practices of 
their national constituencies.162 Moreover, the few representatives of 
developing countries who do attend are usually late participants in a 
160 Eg, India ratified CEDAW and CRC in response to the increasing international scrutiny 
of its human rights record, after Pakistan tabled a resolution to the Commission of 
Human Rights on the state of human rights in Kashmir. Iran also acceded to CRC 
because it was under pressure at the time due to its human rights record. Brazil 
ratified CERD to show some participation in international human rights; the former 
USSR ratified CERD and CEDAW as part of the international trend to do so, not want-
ing to lag behind other states; the same applies to the Philippines with respect to 
CRC. Japan ratified CERD when it was the only liberal democracy left that had not 
done so. PE Veerman The rights of the child and the changing image of childhood 
(1992) 183.
161 South Africa ratified five treaties shortly after the end of apartheid. Institute for Human 
Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ http://212.60.76.30/modules/news/index.php?storytopic=16 
(accessed 11 September 2007).
162 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 68.
       
predetermined process.163 Hence they have to work with concepts and 
mechanisms already called from sources other than their own.164
Often, delegates of developing countries have no alternative position 
to present, since their national constituencies did not have the chance 
to articulate different proposals based on their indigenous experiences 
and in response to the realities of their own countries.165 At the nego-
tiating sessions, they often lack a sense of familiarity and support from 
home. Such negotiators, particularly those from developing countries, 
are therefore ill-equipped to make a meaningful contribution to the 
proceedings.166
Moreover, many initiatives on child labour have generally been based 
on an assumption that the problem is confined to the poor countries. 
The societies and groups most determined to eliminate the practice 
have thus tended to come from the developed world. Industrialised 
countries have thus dominated the discussion on child labour and been 
the ones to define it and to stipulate its remedies in accordance with 
interests and ideologies of these countries of origin. A serious inequal-
ity in the negotiating positions therefore exists. It is for this reason that 
one has to look beyond formalistic participation in order to appreciate 
the realities of implementation. Countries that did not participate, or 
had little opportunity to contribute during the negotiating process, 
will most likely lack the motivation and wherewithal to implement the 
provisions of the instruments.167
The ILO has tried to remedy this inequality by providing different 
child labour standards for poor nations and their developed counter-
parts.168 Such attempts have hardly been successful considering that 
international values and imperatives are still imposed on the latter 
without due consideration of the different methods of rearing children, 
163 CRC came about as a result of long-term advocacy by voluntary organisations such 
as Save the Children and, more specifically, in response to Poland’s call for an inter-
national instrument on children’s rights to mark the 1979 International Year of the 
Child. M Freeman The moral status of children: Essays on the rights of the child (1997) 
53.
164 As above. 
165 As above.
166 Only four developing countries had representation at the CRC sessions of the 
Open-Ended Working Group, namely, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal and Egypt. Their 
participation, however, was sporadic. The rest of the African countries (including 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe and South Africa) never took part at all. Throughout the pro-
ceedings, NGOs representing the interests of children were involved only periodically 
and their participation was badly co-ordinated. Freeman (n 163 above) 53; Veerman 
(n 160 above); IHRDA (n 161 above).
167 It would also seem that before the drafting and negotiation stage, little effort is put 
into researching the indigenous societies of non-Western countries, which are meant 
to benefit from those instruments. Moreover, there is little regard to whether or not 
the representatives of countries have done the necessary consultations with their 
national constituencies. 
168 The gradation of standards has thus historically been part of ILO Minimum Age 
Conventions.
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and varying conceptions of childhood. Moreover, it is not clear how the 
degree of difference in child labour standards was determined between 
developed and developing nations (as exemplified by the terms of the 
1973 Minimum Age Convention).169
3 Conclusion
It should be clear at this point that, while there is an international 
consensus on the concern for children, societies differ on the concep-
tion of childhood, how a child’s welfare may best be secured and the 
acceptable forms of child activity. The discord between international 
law and African cultures on the laws and policies needed to deal with 
child labour represents fundamental differences on the social prob-
lem that should be eliminated. There is a growing consensus on the 
existence of a definitional problem, which appears to spring from two 
sources. The first is that developing countries which had tended to 
regard child labour as necessary are now being forced to view it as 
only harmful. The second is a recognition that the international law has 
a one-dimensional view of the problem which begs relevance in the 
societies of developing countries.170
Clearly, it is difficult to come to a common understanding of what is 
hazardous to a child, besides the more obvious dangers to health and 
social development of extreme forms of child labour such as sexual 
exploitation, mining and construction. Social and economic consid-
erations will subjectively influence the determination. For instance, Afri-
can societies do not consider the fetching of firewood and water as in 
anyway hazardous, but as an integral part of the socialisation process, 
while members of more modern societies would never send a child to 
a ‘big bad forest’ to fetch wood or to a well to fetch water ‘where there 
is a risk of drowning’. To the latter, such work is of no value to a child’s 
social development.
Given the questions that come up about the current and dominant 
perceptions of child labour, it is apparent that international law is 
based on assumptions which lack the substantiation of comprehensive 
research. ’We are confronted … with the very weak state of knowledge 
and understanding of the causes of abuse, exploitation and harm 
in work situations …’171 There has, therefore, been a tendency to 
define work generally, and vaguely, as a problem for children, and to 
base inquiries on individual case studies, many of which focused on 
situations of serious peril. A consequence has been the formulation 
of blanket legal (and policy and programme) measures which were 
169 Smolin (n 156 above) 393. 
170 Myers (n 51 above) 22.
171 B White ‘Defining the intolerable: Child work, global standards and cultural relativ-
ism’ (1999) 6 Childhood 133 135.
       
ill-suited to the children whose work was not particularly hazardous 
or exploitative, and could be combined successfully with school work. 
The specific circumstances and needs have not been understood. 172
Many of the studies provide a fairly static picture of children’s working 
lives, neglecting their work histories. These lead to misleading conclu-
sions. The intensity of children’s work and their schedules sometimes 
change over short periods of time. This general lack of theoretical and 
methodological rigour results in a poor conceptualisation of working 
children as victims, and their classification, often erroneously, into cat-
egories defined very loosely by their circumstances or situation.
CRC and the ILO instruments on child labour therefore attempt to 
achieve the impossible: imposing a set of general standards of right 
treatment for children in a world with vastly different understandings 
about childhood and child development.173 The crusading moralism 
that characterises the child rights movement poses a problem for the 
practical and objective reconsideration of child labour (and other issues 
on child welfare). It leads to a rigidity of thought and action in an era 
when more flexibility is essential to the successful adaptation of child 
protection methods to the exigencies of a changing world.174 The rights 
codified in international instruments leave little room for compromise 
or an allowance for competing cultural values and foreclose reflection 
on intricate issues that are not soluble by simplistic formulae.175
What is apparent is that the principles of human rights do not per-
mit people, in particular cases, to make individual judgments about 
whether abolishing child labour is in fact reasonable in the circum-
stances. The laws on child labour are ill-adapted to what Africans 
expect: a careful discussion of trade-offs and competing concerns, 
thereby facing a potential backlash by those concerned with cultural, 
familial or personal autonomy.176
While it is vital to retain or recapture cherished traditional values, 
one must be cautious about relying on dying, lost and even mythical 
cultural norms.177 The relativist critique of human rights should not 
support a general challenge to children’s rights but rather ‘create a 
contingent, partial warning about the appropriate content of rights 
172 See A Bekele & WE Myers First things first in child labour: Eliminating work detrimental 
to children (1995) 29. 
173 As above.
174 Boyden et al (n 5 above) 324-326.
175 C Sunstein ‘Rights and their critics’ (1995) 70 Notre Dame Law Review 727 730-2.
176 In addition, the rules which the human rights movement seeks to impose would, if 
actually enforced, severely limit cultural, familial, religious and personal freedom. 
Smolin (n 156 above) 400.
177 ‘Leaders sing the praises of traditional communities – while they wield arbitrary 
power antithetical to traditional values, pursue development policies that systemati-
cally undermine traditional communities and replace traditional leaders with corrupt 
cronies and party hacks. Such cynical manipulation of tradition occurs everywhere.’ 
J Donnelly Universal human rights in theory and practice (1989) 118.
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and about the possibly harmful way in which certain social institutions 
safeguard rights’.178
In short, one must always bear in mind that the absence of individual 
‘rights’ in the African cultural context does not mean that children are 
systematically abused or neglected as a matter of policy. Such treat-
ment is not deliberate. The powerful ethic of generosity towards all 
kinfolk, apparent in African traditional societies, assured children of 
nurture and protection within families. The African social and legal 
system does in fact assure human dignity in all material respects.179
Child labour principles, as with other human rights principles, have 
thus not had full effect on African society because cultural practices 
persist. Human rights instruments have not sought to address the ten-
sions between their provisions and local cultures. The lack of attention 
to the particularities of children’s situations has led to generalised and 
one-dimensional legal remedies that are likely to be weak or counter-
productive for the children involved.180
There is a need to move beyond the narrow education, health and 
safety concerns of the current international child labour laws and to 
place a greater emphasis on discovering other protective and pro-
motional measures to enable children to grow and develop. These 
measures will look at children’s work, principally in terms of its impact, 
both negative and positive, on their welfare and development.181 
Instead of having a blanket prohibition of child labour, there is a need 
for the retention of work that builds character, initiative, and qualities 
of organisation, discipline and love of knowledge.
Child labour must be approached from the perspective of all the con-
trolling sectors of children’s activities, namely, the children themselves, 
parents, extended family, community, educators and employers. Draft-
ers must find a common ground between all these stakeholders so 
there is a unity of purpose reflected in the law.
Since it has proved to be impractical to impose a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to childhood and child labour on all societies, African coun-
tries must define and stipulate remedies for child labour in accordance 
with their own interests and ideologies. The laws governing child work 
must not stand in isolation, but should be conceived and implemented 
to fit their social context and should work harmoniously with other 
lines of action in a national policy. To avoid being counter-productive, 
this legislation must, therefore, uphold healthy child development 
178 Steiner & Alston (n 100 above) 336-337. 
179 Bennett (n 43 above) 5.
180 Myers (n 51 above) 42.
181 R Himes (ed) Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Resource mobili-
sation in low-income countries (1995) 190-191.
       
processes and be supported by social, economic, and educational 
measures.182
Unfortunately, the imposition of these international laws based on 
modern economic and social practice has so far created problems, due 
primarily to a failure to consider sufficiently the state of development 
of the communities upon which they imposed or the full social and 
economic implications.183 It is thus imperative for the law to express 
the collective will of the people which is neither the ‘idealistic opinion 
of the reformer, nor the opinion of a self-centred commercialism’.184 
The law must not act only as an external complex of rules to which 
reality is subjected, but should also seek to express reality itself.185
The success of child labour laws in Africa will depend on the level of 
cultural legitimacy accorded to the norms contained therein.186 If the 
law is found to be lower than the plane of public opinion, then it would 
be wise to consider changing it in conformity with that opinion and 
with certain well-defined principles.187 Without wide social support, 
child labour laws may in fact attract hostility from the communities 
and the very people they are intended to protect. Where belief in the 
legitimacy of child labour is strong in a society, the law may actually 
reinforce support for the outlawed custom.188 The likelihood of a rejec-
tion of the law increases where a legal system is imported from another 
culture or for other reasons is not accepted as a source of authority 
to be obeyed out of duty. It is thus imperative for the law not to be 
imposed from the top or by external forces, but come from the societ-
ies themselves.189
In creating children’s rights norms that are suitable for Southern 
African societies, it is vital that we do not reinforce much of the taken 
182 Eg, in Zimbabwe, the Labour Relations Regulations of Statutory Instrument 72 of 
1997 and sec 10A of the Children’s Act (Cap 5:06) of 2001 which regulate the work 
of children must be supported by policies from the Ministries of Education; Health 
and Child Welfare; Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; and Youth Sports and 
Culture. Local government and traditional authorities must also be involved in con-
scientising and mobilising their respective communities in putting into effect such 
legal interventions.
183 A St J Hannigan ‘The imposition of Western law forms upon primitive societies’ 
(1961) 4 Comparative Studies in Society and History 1-5.
184 Hanson & Vandaele (n 4 above) 75.
185 Legal systems do not float in a cultural void, free of space and time and social context, 
but ought to reflect what is happening in the societies they regulate. LM Friedman 
‘Borders: On the emerging sociology of transnational law’ (1996) 32 Stanford Journal 
of International Law 65 72-75.
186 T Kaime ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of 
children’s rights in Africa: Some reflections’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Jour-
nal 223.
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can Academy of Political and Social Science 45-52.
188 SB Burman & BE Harrell-Bond The imposition of law: Studies on law and social control 
(1979) 16.
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for granted assumptions about our cultures.190 The ways of reframing 
and reformulating the law on child labour in the sub-region must avoid 
falling into the trap of essentialising culture.191 Rather, law makers 
must recognise its fluidity and diversity, and also recognise children 
as the agents of culture, not simply its victims and challengers of 
patriarchy.192
As the essentialism of culture all too often entails the preservation 
of social, political and economic power, it may, in fact, justify and per-
petuate the abuse of the work of children.193 Generalisations of a girl 
child’s cultural role in the domestic arena can result in her being denied 
formal education in preference to her male counterpart.194 Such essen-
tialism plays into the hands of economists and political strategists, who 
depend on the labour of children.
The effect of essentialising culture is for one to become less mindful 
of its dynamism, and thus remain tied to norms that are obsolete in the 
present-day reality of urbanisation, globalisation and multiculturalism. 
South Africa, for instance, is a perfect example of a country which is de 
facto a state of racial, cultural and ethnic diversity, where the essential-
ism of any culture would be a distortion of reality. Essentialism rules 
out the possibility of belonging to multiple, hybrid and even shifting 
cultures.195 We thus need to accept that cultures within the Southern 
African region are internally diverse so that the evaluation of any laws 
and policies that aims to recognise or accommodate a cultural minority 
must take into account its effects on different groups and the way in 
which that policy or law may affect the power relations within those 
groups.196
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